Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 1st MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 10 May 1999, at 10 a.m.

Temporary Chairman: Mr. WYZNER (Poland)

Chairman: Mr. REYES RODRIGUEZ (Colombia)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

OPENING OF THE SESSION

1. The TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN, on behalf of the Preparatory Committee, expressed sympathy to the Government and people of China and to the families of those who had been killed on 7 May 1999 when the Embassy of China in Belgrade, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had been hit by missiles.

2. At the invitation of the Chairman, the members of the Committee observed a minute of silence in memory of the victims.

3. The TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN recalled that, in conformity with the decision of the 1995 Conference, the purpose of the Preparatory Committee's meetings was "to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference". Since the Conference had decided that the review process should be strengthened, the Committee should build on the experience acquired during its first two sessions and actively seek agreement in that regard. It was the Committee's responsibility to lay a solid foundation for the work of the 2000 Review Conference.

ELECTION OF THE CHAIRMAN

4. The TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN recalled that, at its second session, in 1998, the Preparatory Committee had decided that Mr. Adolfo Garcia Gonzales of Colombia, representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States Parties to the Treaty, would serve as Chairman at its third session. Mr. Gonzales had since been called on by his Government to perform other functions and would therefore not be able to assume the chairmanship of the Committee. The Group of Non-Aligned and Other States Parties to the Treaty had therefore nominated Mr. Reyes Rodríguez of Colombia to serve as Chairman of the Committee at the third session. Preliminary consultations had indicated that that candidature enjoyed the support of all delegations. He took it that the Committee wished to endorse that proposal.

5. Mr. Reyes Rodríguez (Colombia) was elected Chairman by acclamation.

6. Mr. Reyes Rodríguez (Colombia) took the Chair.

7. The CHAIRMAN thanked the members of the Preparatory Committee for the confidence they had placed in his country and in himself personally by electing him to chair a session of crucial importance, since its purpose was to develop the necessary consensus.

8. He expressed heartfelt condolences to China and welcomed Brazil, which had acceded to the Treaty since the Committee's second session and was participating in the Committee's work for the first time.

9. Although they had led to no breakthroughs, the 1997 and 1998 sessions had been fruitful, since they had helped to identify areas of possible convergence

of views and had led to a better understanding as to why positions were still far apart on certain issues. Members of the Committee should try not to waste time by reiterating well-known positions. Instead, they should strive to consolidate achievements through compromise and a spirit of constructive cooperation in order to reach agreement on outstanding issues. Specifically, the Committee would have to address without any undue delay a number of difficult organizational and procedural matters which were interconnected with inherently sensitive substantive issues, such as the organization of the 2000 Review Conference, the appointment of the President and other officers of the Conference, the draft agenda of the Conference, its rules of procedure and the allocation of items to the Main Committees.

10. In its report to the 2000 Review Conference, the Committee should reflect the substantive discussion that had taken place throughout the preparatory process.

11. He drew attention to the agenda adopted by the Preparatory Committee for all its sessions, which was contained in paragraph 8 of document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/32.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

Election of officers

12. The CHAIRMAN recalled the Preparatory Committee had decided at its first session that the chairmen of the various sessions, when not serving as chairmen, would serve as vice-chairmen. Accordingly, Mr. Reimaa (Finland), Chairman of the first session, and Mr. Wyzner (Poland), Chairman of the second session, would serve as Vice-Chairmen of the third session.

Methods of work

13. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the indicative timetable, published as document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/INF.2, on which consultations had been held during the previous week. He took it that the Committee wished to adopt it.

14. It was so decided.

15. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that Cuba and Israel had requested to participate in the work of the Committee as observers. At its first session, the Committee had decided that States not parties to the Treaty would be allowed, upon request, to attend the open meetings of the Committee.

16. The following intergovernmental organizations had also made requests to attend the Committee's meetings: the South Pacific Forum, depositary of the Treaty of Rarotonga; the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL); the League of Arab States; the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization; and the European Union.

PREPARATORY WORK FOR THE REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE VIII, PARAGRAPH 3, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DECISIONS AND THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE 1995 REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

General exchange of views

17. The CHAIRMAN said that delegations had expressed interest in indicating their views on the expected products of the 2000 Review Conference. They should limit their statements to 10 minutes.

18. Mr. NENE (South Africa) noted that the decision adopted in 1995 had not been fully applied and that the two previous sessions of the Preparatory Committee had achieved mixed results in part because there had never been agreement on the meaning of the phrase "strengthened review process". By using the Treaty itself as the lodestar and the 1995 Review and Extension Conference as the yardstick for measuring progress achieved, confidence would be built in the regime, which comprised, besides the decision to strengthen the review process, the full package of texts adopted in 1995, namely, the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the decision to extend the Treaty itself indefinitely and the resolution on the Middle East. The texts had not been adopted in a vacuum; rather, they formed a whole.

19. From his delegation's perspective, the decision on the strengthened review process was very clear. Document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/5, a working paper submitted by his delegation, contained a detailed description of the respective tasks of the Preparatory Committee and of the 2000 Review Conference, as defined in the 1995 decision. It also contained the list of documents that the Committee and the Conference had to prepare.

20. In his delegation's view, it was vital for the Committee to focus primarily on considering and developing updated statements of objectives and ways of attaining certain specific goals by 2005, and to make recommendations to the Conference on specific proposals or initiatives, such as the steps envisaged in the resolution on the Middle East or the possible adoption of a protocol on security assurances.

21. As indicated in the aforementioned working paper, while the Conference would have to adopt by consensus the 2000 principles and objectives, which must receive unanimous support, and while it would be necessary to have a consensus on the adoption of the final declaration, a consensus would not necessarily have to be achieved with respect to all its contents, regarding which there might be some disagreement. The document could contain statements reflecting the differences in interpretation.

22. His delegation, for its part, would take up the substantive issues of the Treaty in its statements under the nuclear disarmament, safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear energy clusters, and during the consideration of security assurances, the fissile material treaty and the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

23. Mr. SEIBERT (Germany), speaking on behalf of the European Union, the Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union, the associated country Cyprus, the European Free Trade Association countries members of the European Economic Area, and, in addition, Iceland and Liechtenstein, said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remained the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of disarmament efforts. The European Union therefore encouraged achievement of the objectives laid down in the Treaty itself, in the decisions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and in the resolution on the Middle East. The best use should be made of the ongoing NPT review process in order to optimize the non-proliferation regime and to further disarmament, including nuclear disarmament. In that regard, the universality of the Treaty was very important. The European Union therefore welcomed Brazil's accession to the Treaty in September 1998 and urged the four States which had not yet done so to follow its example.

24. The European Union was deeply concerned over the nuclear tests which had been conducted by India and Pakistan soon after the second session of the Preparatory Committee. Those tests had run counter to global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. However, the Union welcomed the resumption of dialogue between the two countries and their declared intention to accede to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to participate in negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. The European Union was ready to contribute to efforts to promote non-proliferation and confidence-building in South Asia.

25. Since the current Preparatory Committee session was the last one before the 2000 Review Conference, it was essential to start drafting the recommendations for the Conference, taking stock of the implementation of the Treaty over the previous five years, and to consider how to reflect the outcome of the Conference itself. All legitimate interests and concerns should be taken into account.

26. The European Union had been active in promoting the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and called on all States to sign and ratify it, particularly such nuclear-weapon States as China, India, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and the United States of America. It also urged all member States of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to re-establish without delay the ad hoc committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In the view of the European Union, nuclear-weapon States should make determined and systematic efforts to reduce their stocks. It was therefore disappointed that the START II Treaty had still not entered into force and also called for the immediate opening of negotiations on a START III Treaty.

27. Other measures that were vital in the area of nuclear non-proliferation included security assurances for non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Such assurances could take the form of an international legally-binding instrument. The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones was also an important element for international peace and security and was

a complementary instrument to the Treaty. The European Union therefore welcomed the progress achieved in that area, especially in Central Asia, South-East Asia and Africa, and was committed to the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East.

28. The European Union continued to support the verification role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which had adopted in 1997 a Model Protocol aimed at strengthening the efficiency of its safeguards system. The European Union attached great importance to the universal adoption of the Model Protocol. It reaffirmed the importance of the statement in the decision on principles and objectives that fissile material for peaceful nuclear activities should be placed under IAEA safeguards, and it welcomed the steps taken to set up a verification mechanism and to implement a programme for preventing and combating trafficking in nuclear material.

29. The existing systems of export controls in the nuclear field should also be further improved because it was essential for exporting States to assume their responsibilities and ensure that exports of sensitive materials, equipment and technologies were subject to an appropriate system of surveillance and control. Transparency in export control regimes was essential to ensure a greater understanding both of the necessity for such controls and for the needs of developing countries seeking advanced technology. The European Union recognized the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in conformity with articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty. It was, however, concerned about the interruption of IAEA inspections in Iraq and about the problem of safeguards implementation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

30. The Conference would have a two-fold task in 2000: taking stock of progress achieved and deciding on steps to be taken in certain areas. The European Union expected to take part in a fruitful and lively debate which would contribute constructively to the review of the Treaty and would build on the consensus achieved in 1995.

31. Mr. SHA Zukang (China), after reading out a statement by his Government condemning the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade by the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), said that the fact that the twentieth century was ending as it had begun - with a war in the Balkans - was not a mere repetition of history but the result of the Cold-War mentality adopted by some countries and blocs of countries that conjured up imaginary enemies and interfered at will in the internal affairs of other countries, while the pursuit of peace and development had become the common aspiration of all nations. Against that backdrop, the nuclear disarmament process between the Russian Federation and the United States of America had stalled, the ratification of the CTBT was advancing very slowly, the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty had not yet commenced, nuclear tests had been recently conducted and the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation had increased substantially. To promote the disarmament process and safeguard international peace and security, a new security concept should be developed based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation.

32. From a historical perspective, the motives of nuclear-weapon States differed. Some had sought to acquire nuclear weapons in order to maintain their superiority and dominate the world, a strategy which not only undermined international peace and security but also ran counter to efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation. On the other hand, China had been compelled to develop nuclear weapons under specific historical circumstances and solely for self-defence purposes, while trying to safeguard world peace. China had always adopted a responsible attitude towards nuclear disarmament and had made important contributions to that process. It had solemnly declared that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons and would not use them against non-nuclear-weapon States or against nuclear-weapon-free zones. It had never deployed nuclear weapons on foreign soil. It had never participated in the arms race and had conducted a very limited number of tests. It had supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and had always advocated the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons.

33. In order to eliminate nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear war, the Russian Federation and the United States of America should assume special responsibility and should continue to drastically reduce their respective nuclear arsenals; the NPT should be observed in full and in good faith; nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons; efforts should be made for the early entry into force of the CTBT; and negotiations should be conducted for the conclusion of a universal and verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty and a convention banning nuclear weapons.

34. To achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world, it was necessary to maintain an international environment of peace, security, stability and trust propitious to progress in nuclear disarmament and to observe two principles: global strategic stability should be preserved; and no country's security should be threatened. However, a few countries were adopting strategies aimed at enhancing their offence and defence capabilities, especially through ballistic missile defence programmes, which created new obstacles for the ongoing negotiations and disrupted global and regional strategic balance and stability, possibly setting off a new round of the arms race and stimulating the proliferation of missile technology.

35. Nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were complementary to each other and were closely linked to international peace and security. Yet, hegemonism and power politics were currently jeopardizing the sovereignty of certain countries, which could be forced to resort to every possible means available to defend themselves. The result might eventually be the collapse of existing international regimes on disarmament, including those aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. All peace-loving people of the international community must face the challenges posed by NATO and the United States of America and strive to establish a just new international political and economic order and oppose hegemonism and the pursuit of military superiority and aggression. The new world order would provide the basis for achieving nuclear disarmament, and the 2000 Review Conference could make meaningful strides towards that end.

36. Mr. MOHER (Canada) said that Canada attached fundamental importance to the Treaty, which was the essential foundation for international nuclear disarmament and for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Weakening it would undermine international peace and security. It was therefore crucially important to enhance its authority and integrity and in that regard Canada had set out three main principles to guide the Committee's work: permanence with accountability; a qualitatively different process that both evaluated and was forward-looking; and pragmatism and dynamism.

37. The context in which the Committee would be working was even more critical than in the past. Thus, efforts to achieve a progressive reduction in the inventories of nuclear weapons leading to their complete elimination were at a standstill. He would expand further on Canada's approach to nuclear disarmament at a later stage.

38. The nuclear tests in South Asia in 1998 had been a further blow to the nuclear regimes in force. Although the international community had condemned those tests, it needed to do more than deplore or condemn the tests. Canada was firmly opposed to any nuclear realpolitik which revalidated nuclear weapons and underwrote proposals to legitimize nuclear weapons or normalize a so-called minimum nuclear deterrence in South Asia. Following that path would be tantamount to devaluing the NPT, turning it from the treaty of commitment that it should be into a treaty of convenience.

39. As far as strengthening the review process for the Treaty was concerned, his delegation's view was that all future review conferences should produce two primary documents: a backward-looking document, which would evaluate the results of the period under review, including the implementation of undertakings of the States parties; and a forward-looking document, which would identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future. Canada attached greater priority to the latter document. Moreover, each review conference should consider the functioning of the review process itself. It was Canada's view that the 2000 Review Conference should produce three key documents: a backward-looking review document; a forward-looking principles and objectives 2000 document; and a forward-looking document on the review process itself. Canada advocated that the 2000 Review Conference should reconfirm the international community's commitment to the strengthened review process, which should enable States parties to deal on an ongoing basis with substantive issues, and not just procedural issues.

40. In his delegation's view, the objectives for the third session of the Preparatory Committee were, first, that participants should agree on a recommendation as to the number and nature of documents that the Review Conference should produce. Second, the discussion on the possible content of the documents to be produced by the Review Conference should be continued. In that connection, his delegation maintained the view that it would be premature and inappropriate for the Preparatory Committee to attempt to negotiate in advance the substance of whatever documents would be agreed at the Conference. Third, the Committee should reflect on the strengthened review process itself in order to determine whether it had fulfilled its promise and whether it could be further enhanced.

41. In order to facilitate the Preparatory Committee's work, Canada had submitted three working papers published as documents NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/2 to 4.

42. Ms. ARYSTANBEKOVA (Kazakhstan) said that the primary role in promoting efforts with respect to disarmament and non-proliferation rested with the United Nations. Moreover, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were interdependent issues which could be resolved only through joint efforts by both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States.

43. Kazakhstan was strongly opposed to anything that was likely to undermine the non-proliferation regime and called on those countries that were not parties to the NPT to heed the opinion of the vast majority of States and accede to it. The negotiations on the prohibition of the production of fissile material were of vital importance to the implementation of the Treaty. Therefore, all States possessing fissile material should be involved in the negotiations in order to produce a universally applicable convention banning the production of such material.

44. Moreover, legal force should be given to the negative security assurances on the basis of Security Council resolution 984 (1995).

45. IAEA should be lauded for its accomplishments in the area of monitoring the transfer of nuclear material, the strengthening of the international safeguards system and cooperation with respect to nuclear safety and waste management. The Agency's action had helped to resolve the problems facing the international community in the area of nuclear non-proliferation. In a world where the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes was widespread, the need for maintaining and strengthening the non-proliferation regime was more vital than ever.

46. Her delegation believed that nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constituted an important mechanism for the strengthening of the international non-proliferation regime. It attached great importance to the work on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and had, moreover, submitted two draft resolutions on the subject. Her delegation was especially keen to ensure the success of that endeavour, since Kazakhstan's population, environment and economy had been seriously affected by the nuclear tests conducted on its territory.

47. Her delegation hoped that the 2000 Review Conference would provide the opportunity to make further progress towards the goal of complete nuclear disarmament and was ready to continue strengthening its cooperation with the delegations of the States parties to the Treaty in order to attain that goal.

48. Mr. BAALI (Algeria) said that his delegation endorsed all the elements contained in the document submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

49. By acceding to the Treaty in January 1995, Algeria had wanted to make formal its firm commitment to general and complete disarmament and help to promote the universality of the Treaty.

50. On 11 February 1998, Algeria had ratified the Treaty of Pelindaba on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. By becoming the third State party to that instrument, Algeria had confirmed its commitment to and confidence in the prospects for general disarmament, which daily came closer as the nuclear-weapon-free zones, currently covering half the planet, increased in number.

51. The Treaty had a three-fold objective: to bring about nuclear disarmament, ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. While the indefinite extension of the Treaty undoubtedly constituted a major event, it was regrettable to note that those three goals had not been fully achieved.

52. Moreover, the events in South Asia and the adoption of the new strategic concept, which reaffirmed the importance of nuclear weapons in security and the maintenance of peace, would appear to effectively frustrate the hopes of many countries and reflected a trend that was diametrically opposed to the positions of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. They also reflected the enduring doctrines that continued to promote an arms race that could no longer be justified by any argument.

53. That was why top priority should be given to nuclear disarmament, to persuading the countries concerned to take the appropriate concrete measures to dismantle all nuclear weapons. It was precisely such a step that the International Court of Justice had recommended in its advisory opinion of 8 July 1987, in which it had unanimously reaffirmed the obligation of all States to bring to a successful conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects, under strict and effective control.

54. The question of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices deserved serious consideration, and his delegation welcomed the agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to consider it. While most countries seemed to agree on the need to undertake negotiations on that issue, disagreements remained as to the organizational framework and the scope of the convention to be adopted in that field. Any ban on the production of fissile material for military purposes should deal with the question of existing stocks, which should be placed under effective international control.

55. His delegation strongly believed that nuclear-weapon States should unconditionally provide universal negative security assurances. Such assurances should go beyond the provisions of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and should be codified in a legally binding instrument by the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body dealing with that subject.

56. His delegation also accorded considerable importance to the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In that regard, the goals of non-proliferation should not under any circumstances be taken as an excuse for denying developing countries the legitimate right of access to nuclear technology and to its use for peaceful purposes. IAEA should not only combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons but should also provide the countries that had voluntarily given up nuclear weapons as a military option with the technology that they needed. To that end, the Agency should be given adequate resources.

57. The resolution on the Middle East, adopted under a comprehensive agreement in 1995, was still very relevant in view of the stalemate in the peace process and Israel's refusal to accede to the Treaty, even though all the Arab countries of the region were parties to it. In that connection, his delegation welcomed the adoption by the Disarmament Commission on 30 April 1999 of guiding principles on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. In that regard, it once again called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

58. The work of the third session of the Preparatory Committee should focus on substantive issues and build on the outcomes of the two previous sessions.

59. In order for the review of the functioning of the Treaty to be comprehensive and objective, it must first of all comply with the provisions of the Treaty. The assessment of the document on the principles of non-proliferation and disarmament should not replace the evaluation of the implementation of the Treaty itself. That was why his delegation favoured a text that would document the article-by-article implementation of the Treaty, stipulate the new commitments to be undertaken and mention the resolution on the Middle East and the question of security assurances.

60. Speaking as the Chairman of the Group of Arab States, he announced that the Group would submit a working paper on the Middle East.

61. Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt) said that, in his delegation's view, the nuclear non-proliferation regime could only be a temporary step towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world, under strict and effective international control. That goal could be attained only if States renounced selective policies and outdated strategies and doctrines based on the concept of the nuclear deterrent. Although 30 years had elapsed since the entry into force of the Treaty, and despite its indefinite extension in 1995, the world still failed to apply its principles and had not achieved its goals. Despite some progress by the nuclear-weapon States with respect to unilateral and bilateral reductions of their nuclear arsenals, and contrary to the intentions that had resulted in the conclusion of the Treaty, the world was still weighed down by huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons amassed by the five nuclear-weapon States. That situation had led to a proliferation of weapons among other States, which had viewed the failure of the nuclear-weapon States to honour their commitments with respect to nuclear disarmament as a valid excuse and an invitation to carry out nuclear tests, and that in turn had led other States to start producing nuclear weapons. His delegation therefore wondered whether the Treaty was really effective not only in terms of its fundamental objectives but also in terms of the responsibility of nuclear-weapon States.

62. Prior to the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995, Egypt had already stated that the decision to extend it should be contingent on progress in the Treaty review process and should be taken after the universal accession of all States without exception and without partiality to the Treaty, a goal which had yet to be attained. It was thus clear that the extension of the Treaty in 1995 could not have been achieved without the adoption of a package of three decisions and a resolution on the Middle East. That package of decisions had

facilitated the indefinite extension of the Treaty before a review of the implementation of its provisions could be carried out, because of the insistence of the nuclear-weapon States, after the failure to adopt the final document by traditional means.

63. Although the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee had not arrived at a consensus as to what needed to be transmitted to the 2000 Review Conference, new facts and lessons had emerged and could be summed up in the following way: (a) given the Treaty's indefinite extension, its review process should not be based on the Treaty alone but should also take into consideration the decisions and the resolution on the Middle East in the 1995 package. To select certain elements of that package while ignoring others would be to court failure; (b) the review process should be conducted in accordance with the 1995 decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty, in particular paragraph 7 (see NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC 1) to the effect that Review Conferences should look forward as well as back and should also evaluate the implementation of undertakings of the States parties and identify the areas in which further progress should be sought in the future. That approach called for the establishment of subsidiary bodies by the Main Committees of the Review Conferences.

64. It was obvious that a complete review of the substance of the Treaty needed to be carried out in order to re-establish the authority of the Treaty as the basis of a universal non-proliferation regime. However, negative facts and situations, such as the nuclear tests that had been conducted in South Asia, and Israel's continuing refusal to accede to the Treaty, despite the reiterated appeals of the international community that it do so, and to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, had undermined the credibility of the Treaty. There was no hope of remedying the situation through a superficial approach, because those problems were undermining not only the continuity of the non-proliferation regime but also regional and international peace and security and their substance had to be addressed.

65. His delegation expressly requested that the 2000 Review Conference should adopt a comprehensive forward-looking review document that took into account the negative situations that had occurred in the past. A new decision should be adopted on new principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation. However, the adoption of such a comprehensive document should in no way diminish the importance of the Treaty as the basis for the non-proliferation regime and should not result in fresh instances of failure to fulfil commitments, especially on the part of nuclear-weapon States.

66. It was therefore vital for the third session of the Preparatory Committee to reach agreement on the draft recommendations to be transmitted to the 2000 Review Conference. In that connection, he drew attention to the working paper submitted by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, which should be included in the draft recommendations of the Preparatory Committee. His delegation, together with other Arab delegations, would also submit two separate working papers on the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

67. Ms. MARTINIC (Argentina) said that her country was one of the most active in the efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Since

its accession to the Treaty, its main goal had been to contribute to world peace and stability, including at the regional level. It was therefore anxious to ensure that each of the countries of the region also acceded to the Treaty. That goal was underscored in the Political Declaration of MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile as a Zone of Peace, adopted on 24 July 1998 at the presidential level. By that Declaration, the Presidents of the countries of the region had agreed on the following important goals: to declare that MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile formed a zone of peace, free from weapons of mass destruction; to support in the relevant international forums the full application and the strengthening of instruments and mechanisms for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; to make concerted efforts in the relevant international forums to make headway, in the context of a gradual and systematic process, in consolidating international agreements designed to attain the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects; and to encourage cooperation between the member States with a view to the exclusively peaceful and safe use of nuclear energy.

68. The United Nations should consider the virtual universality of the Treaty a success and should also applaud the countries that had played a pioneering role in that regard. They included Mexico, which had taken up the challenge of nuclear proliferation in a highly original manner by making arrangements for the conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which should serve as a model for other countries that wished to establish denuclearized zones. As a result of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Pelindaba and Bangkok and the Antarctic Treaty, the southern hemisphere was now a zone free from nuclear weapons, which contributed to the full achievement of the main objective of the NPT. The countries which had nuclear weapons had either destroyed them or transported them outside their borders. Argentina considered the progress made by the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America promising, and it hoped that the five nuclear-weapon States would pursue their efforts towards nuclear disarmament in order to secure the total elimination of such weapons.

69. However, despite the overall positive record of the collective efforts made in that regard, the danger of nuclear proliferation still remained because the nuclear tests that had recently been carried out in Asia seriously undermined the non-proliferation regime. Argentina was willing to share the experience of IAEA safeguards it had acquired within the framework of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, a facility which had contributed considerably to confidence and balance in the region.

70. Argentina was convinced that exchanges of technology were useful when they took place within the framework of a clear and reliable plan for the responsible use of technology. It therefore endorsed efforts to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system. Generally speaking, Argentina supported the various seminars organized by the nuclear-weapon States on the role of export controls with a view to non-proliferation, the goals of which were consistent with the recommendation in the principles and objectives document adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Moreover, the problem of transporting radioactive waste had made it necessary to strengthen international norms regulating that activity.

71. The universality of the NPT was tangible proof of the determination of the overwhelming majority of the international community to ensure the implementation of that international instrument on disarmament. Moreover, the adoption of the CTBT and the international community's determination to conclude a fissile material cut-off treaty gave her delegation reason to hope that States would enter the twenty-first century armed with the legal instruments that would enable them to rid the world of nuclear weapons. In her delegation's view, it was still necessary to make progress with respect to the objectives of the Treaty in terms of the implementation of the commitments contained therein and the decisions adopted by the 1995 Conference. First of all, a pragmatic approach should be taken to the need to maintain the effectiveness of the Treaty and to strengthen it in areas where it needed to be modernized: systems of assurances, export controls, nuclear-weapon-free zones, use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and transport of radioactive waste. Her delegation therefore fervently hoped that the Preparatory Committee's session would be successful.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.